Gizli AI Ajanları

Yapay zeka ajanlarının en çok ihtiyacı olan şey gizliliktir.

Ajanlar anahtarlarınızı, token’larınızı, gelen kutunuzu ve cüzdanınızı tutar — ve sizin adınıza hareket eder. Onları, compose-hash’in kapsam olduğu ve her eylemin imzalandığı doğrulanmış bir CVM içinde çalıştırın.

Confidential agents, in production.

Personal, coding, security, financial, social, memory, MCP — pick a category, then drill into a specific framework to see how Phala slots into the runtime.

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OpenClaw

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Personal computer-use agent. Sessions, calendars, and inbox sealed in a CVM whose compose-hash IS the permission scope.

Agents · live on Phala Cloud.

Verified counts from Phala Cloud + ClickHouse. Compose-hashes are observed in the Cloud DB; trust-by-construction primitives sit in an attested CVM.

Agent CVMs deployed

12,783

cumulative · all frameworks

Compute hours

16.9M

fleet-wide · since Feb 2025

TDX quotes verified

1.10M

KMS attestation

Compose-hashes observed

2,591

distinct agent builds

Total CVMs deployed by framework

cumulative · since first deploy

1,585

1,545

604

279

168

98

Eliza

Eliza

character agents

7 live · since 2024-12

Clawdi

Clawdi

OpenClaw

193 live · since 2026-01

BlueNexus

BlueNexus

MCP servers

5 live · since 2025-10

Vijil

Vijil

verifiable CI

since 2025-04

Agent Wallet

Agent Wallet

x402 · ERC-8004

1 live · since 2025-05

Hermes

Hermes

Nous Research

7 live · since 2025-01

TDX nodes

17

GPU TEE teepods

8 · 64 GPUs

Regions

5

KMS instances

34

Failed quotes / 24h

1 / 35

Herhangi bir ajan çerçevesini çalıştırın. Tasarım gereği mühürlü.

Kodlama ajanları

Claude Code, Codex, and verifiable CI agents like Vijil run in a CVM where the repo, secrets, and tool tokens stay sealed against the registered compose-hash. Every diff signed before merge.

CODING

marvin@Mac ~/ai-agent % claude code

Claude Code

sealed CVM

· [marvin@Mac] % claude

✓ scope: github.write

› refactor agents/...

⏺ sealed-token: github.pat ✓

✓ Sign-RPC 0x9c1a…

COMPUTER-USE
OpenClawbot
Triage today's inbox — Stanford threads.

tool · gmail.search

3 threads · 11 messages

sealed-token gmail.compose ✓

Bilgisayar kullanan ajanlar

OpenClaw, Hermes, and Pi take over the browser, GUI, and OS — bounded by an attested compose-hash and KMS-gated credentials. Sessions, calendars, inbox stay sealed in the CVM.

Araç ve bellek ajanları

MCP servers (BlueNexus) attest to clients before they accept a connection — mutual RA-TLS. Long-term memory backends (Xtrace) seal shards per app-id; revoking the build evicts memory cleanly.

MCP · MEMORY
BlueNexus MCP
$ mcp connect mcp.bluenexus.ai▸ verifying TDX quote✓ mutual RA-TLS bound• search.web (sealed)• vault.unlock (multi-sig)
WALLET · SECURITY
Agent Walletx402

payment request

$24.00 USDC

api.confidential-llm.ai

scope≤ $50/daymulti-sig2/2 ✓

Cüzdan & zincir üstü ajanlar

Agent Wallet (ERC-8004 + Coinbase x402) and Ironclaw (NEAR security) bind spending scope to the compose-hash. Multi-sig DstackApp gates every signing key; revoke compose-hash → kill access.

permission as identity · scope as compose-hash

Permission is identity. Identity is the compose-hash.

On dstack, an agent’s tool list and credential scope can’t drift from what its build authorizes — there’s no runtime path that widens privilege.

01

Attested launch

dstack-vmm boots the agent CVM. The TDX quote covers the full compose-hash — including system prompt, model digest, and tool list (all in the docker-compose).

02

Sealed credentials

User previously sealed OAuth tokens against this exact compose-hash. dstack-kms releases the wrap key only after the quote matches. No host process ever sees plaintext.

03

Mutual RA-TLS

When Agent A delegates to Agent B, each cert embeds a fresh TDX quote. Both sides run dcap-qvl on the peer and check DstackApp.sol for the allowed-delegates whitelist.

04

Bounded outbound

External tool (Gmail, Stripe, etc.) is outside the trust boundary. The OAuth token leaves only inside the outbound TLS handshake, scope upper-bounded by compose-hash.

05

Signed action log

Every tool call is appended inside the CVM and signed via Sign RPC. Tamper breaks the chain. Auditors verify without trusting Phala or the operator.

Nasıl çalışır

Çoklu ajan pipeline’ı boyunca ilerleyin.

Kimlik bilgileri ve araç kapsamı sapmasının gevşemesini görmek için dstack’i kapatın.

dstack üzerinde Gizli AI Ajanları

Bir CVM içinde ajan bilgisayarı · alt ajan başına sandbox’lar · mühürlü kasa · kapsamı belirlenmiş çıkış kanalı

1
Adım 1 / 5

Attested Boot — TDX Quote Tüm Bilgisayarı Doğrular

dstack-vmm, ajan çalışma zamanını tek bir TDX CVM olarak başlatır. dstack-guest-agent, MRTD + RTMR0–3 + GPU Confidential mode’u kapsayan birleşik bir TDX alıntısı üretir. Kullanıcı alıntıyı RA-TLS üzerinden alır ve dcap-qvl’yi yerel olarak çalıştırır — güven kararı istemci tarafındadır, Intel'in TDX donanım köküne ve zincir üstündeki DstackKms.sol’a dayanır. Phala Network’ten kendisini doğrulaması istenmez.

With dstack: Güven kökü, Intel'in TDX donanım imzasıdır, zincir üstünde sabitlenmiştir — hiçbir istemci Phala’ya veya bulut operatörüne güvenmeden doğrulama yapabilir.

live · Sign-RPC action log

Every tool call leaves a tamper-evident receipt.

Each row is a real-shaped Sign-RPC entry: agent identity, tool, args hash, and a per-app key signature that chains to the TDX root. Auditors verify the log offline — Phala isn't in the trust chain.

action.log · streaming

tamper detected · 0

tsagenttoolargssignatureverify
14:00:01support-bot-v3.2crm.readlookup(account=acme)0x9c1a…f7e2
14:00:03inbox-triagegmail.readlist(after=09:00)0x4f2c…a91e
14:00:04support-bot-v3.2stripe.readcharge(id=ch_3O…)0xc3d4…f7e2
14:00:08cal-botcalendar.readfree(2026-05-05, 30m)0xa1b2…d4f6
14:00:11pnl-monitorwallet.readbalance(addr=0xab…)0xe5f6…b8c0
14:00:14inbox-triagegmail.composedraft(thread=18b4…)0x7d8e…2f1a
14:00:18research-botweb.search"phala dstack v0.6"0x6e9f…c3d4
14:00:21devops-botgithub.writepr.merge(123)0xb1a2…f0e7
14:00:24support-bot-v3.2zendesk.writeticket.reply(8421)0x3d4e…7a8b
14:00:27cal-botcalendar.writecreate(slot=15:00)0x8c9d…e1f2
14:00:31pnl-monitorwebhook.sendalert(threshold=2.5%)0xf2e3…d4c5
14:00:35devops-botsentry.readerrors(env=prod)0x5b6c…7d8e
14:00:39inbox-triagegmail.readlist(label=INBOX)0xa9b8…c7d6
14:00:43research-botdoc.writeappend(notes.md)0x4e5f…6a7b
14:00:47awaiting next call
chain · per-app key → KMS root → TDX root + DstackApp.sol14 rows · all verified offline

Yapay zeka çözüm yolları

Yapay zeka gizliliğe duyarlı verilere dokunduğunda özel modeller kullanın.

Özel model uç noktası ilk giriş noktasıdır. Aynı gizlilik ilkesi ajanlara, veri iş akışlarına ve eğitime de genişler.

LLM API

Özel AI çıkarımı

Promptların, çıktıların ve müşteri bağlamının kullanım sırasında şifreli korunması gereken OpenAI uyumlu model çağrılarını sunun.

Çözümü aç
encrypted

DeepSeek V3.1

128K

$0.27/M input

encrypted

Qwen3 Coder

256K

$0.40/M input

encrypted

Llama 3.3 70B

128K

$0.15/M input

encrypted

GPT OSS 120B

128K

$0.10/M input

encrypted

Claude Sonnet 4.5

200K

$3.00/M input

encrypted

Gemini 2.5 Pro

1M

$1.25/M input

Training

Özel model eğitimi

Veri kümelerini, gradyanları, checkpoint’leri ve değerlendirme izlerini sınırın içinde tutarken tescilli veriler üzerinde modelleri uyarlayın.

Çözümü aç

private training run

Observe without exposing weights.

H100 CC

01

dataset

sealed

02

fine-tune

running

03

eval

private

04

checkpoint

verified

loss curve

proof attached

attestation.json

Data

Private AI verisi

Modelleri hassas kayıtlara taşıyın ve ham veriyi model operatörüne açmadan onaylı çıktılar döndürün.

Çözümü aç

source

EHR data

source

Customer records

source

Internal docs

TEE clean room

query without raw access

approved output

aggregate only
no row exportproof linked

Deploy a confidential agent

Kimlik olarak izin. compose-hash olarak kapsam.

Ajanı docker-compose olarak yayınlayın. compose-hash’i kaydedin. OAuth token’larını seal edin. Ajanlar arası her çağrı, karşı tarafı RA-TLS ile yeniden doğrular.

View docsSatış ekibiyle görüşün
  • 01Mutual RA-TLS between agent CVMs
  • 02Sealed OAuth tokens, KMS-gated
  • 03Compose-hash IS the scope
  • 04Outbound tools bounded by attested code
  • 05Sign-RPC action log
Private AI Agents — Sealed Autonomous AI on TEE | Phala