
TEE vs Enclave vs HSM: Understanding Hardware Security Technologies
Meta Description: Learn the differences between Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), secure enclaves, and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). Discover which technology to use for your security needs.
Target Keywords: TEE vs enclave, TEE vs HSM, hardware security comparison, Intel SGX vs AMD SEV, secure enclave, hardware security module difference
Reading Time: 12 minutes
TL;DR - TEE vs Enclave vs HSM
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), Secure Enclaves, and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are all hardware-based security technologies, but they serve different purposes:
- TEE (AMD SEV, Intel TDX): Protects entire virtual machines or large applications; isolates at the VM/OS level
- Enclave (Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone): Protects small, security-critical code sections within an application; isolates at the process level
- HSM: Dedicated hardware appliance for cryptographic operations and key storage; physically separate from compute
Quick Decision Guide:
- Need to protect an entire application or VM? → Use TEE
- Need to protect a specific function (cryptographic operations, secret handling)? → Use Enclave
- Need tamper-proof key storage or regulatory compliance (FIPS 140-2/3)? → Use HSM
- Need all three? → Use them together in a layered security architecture
Understanding the Hardware Security Landscape
All three technologies—TEEs, Enclaves, and HSMs—solve a common problem: protecting sensitive data and computations from software attacks, malicious administrators, and infrastructure compromise. However, they approach the problem differently and are optimized for different use cases.
The Core Problem
Traditional software security relies on trust:
- Trust the operating system to enforce access controls
- Trust administrators not to abuse elevated privileges
- Trust the cloud provider not to inspect your VMs
Hardware security eliminates these trust dependencies by using physical isolation and cryptography enforced by the CPU or dedicated hardware, making attacks mathematically infeasible rather than just policy-prohibited.
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
What Are TEEs?
A Trusted Execution Environment is a secure area created by the CPU that protects code and data from unauthorized access, including from the operating system, hypervisor, and privileged users.
Modern TEE Technologies:
- AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted Virtualization): Encrypts entire VM memory
- AMD SEV-SNP: Adds integrity protection to prevent memory remapping attacks
- Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions): Creates isolated “Trust Domains” (TDs) for confidential VMs
- ARM CCA (Confidential Compute Architecture): “Realms” for confidential VMs on ARM servers
How TEEs Work
Key Characteristics:
- Scope: Protects entire VMs or large application stacks
- Memory: Gigabytes to terabytes (limited only by system RAM)
- Performance Overhead: 2-10% for most workloads
- Isolation Level: VM-level (everything inside the VM is protected)
- Trusted Computing Base (TCB): OS + application code
When to Use TEEs
Best For:
- Entire applications that need protection (web apps, databases, AI models)
- Lift-and-shift cloud migrations (minimal code changes)
- Multi-tenant clouds where customer data must be isolated
- Regulated industries (healthcare, finance, government)
Example Use Case: A hospital runs a patient records database in an Azure Confidential VM (Intel TDX). The entire database, OS, and queries are protected. Azure administrators cannot access patient data even if they want to.
Secure Enclaves
What Are Enclaves?
A Secure Enclave is a small, isolated region of memory within a running application where sensitive code and data are protected from the rest of the system, including the operating system.
Modern Enclave Technologies:
- Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions): x86 CPU enclaves (up to ~256MB encrypted memory)
- ARM TrustZone: Mobile/embedded enclaves (used in smartphones, IoT)
- AMD SEV-ES + Enclaves: Emerging enclave support on AMD platforms
How Enclaves Work
Key Characteristics:
- Scope: Protects small, security-critical functions within an app
- Memory: Limited (128-256MB for Intel SGX, varies for TrustZone)
- Performance Overhead: 5-50% depending on how much data crosses the enclave boundary
- Isolation Level: Process-level (only specific functions are protected)
- Trusted Computing Base (TCB): Only the enclave code (very small)
When to Use Enclaves
Best For:
- Protecting specific functions (cryptographic operations, authentication, secret handling)
- Applications where you control the codebase and can refactor
- Small data processing (PII handling, financial transactions)
- Minimizing Trusted Computing Base (only security-critical code in enclave)
Example Use Case: A payment processing app uses an Intel SGX enclave to decrypt credit card numbers and authorize transactions. The rest of the app (logging, analytics, UI) runs outside the enclave. Even if the OS is compromised, credit card data remains encrypted in the enclave.
Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)
What Are HSMs?
A Hardware Security Module is a dedicated, tamper-resistant physical device designed specifically for cryptographic operations and secure key storage. HSMs are separate from the servers running your applications.
Common HSM Providers:
- Thales Luna HSM: FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified
- AWS CloudHSM: Managed HSM service
- Azure Dedicated HSM: Cloud HSM integration
- Yubico YubiHSM: Compact USB HSMs for smaller deployments
How HSMs Work
Key Characteristics:
- Scope: Cryptographic key management and operations
- Memory: Small (kilobytes to megabytes—just for keys and crypto state)
- Performance: High-speed crypto operations (10,000s of signatures/sec)
- Isolation Level: Physically separate device
- Compliance: FIPS 140-2/3 certified (required for government, finance)
When to Use HSMs
Best For:
- Storing and using cryptographic keys that must never be exposed
- Compliance requirements (FIPS 140-2 Level 3, PCI-DSS, eIDAS)
- Root certificate authorities (CAs)
- Payment processing (protecting card encryption keys)
- Blockchain validators (securing private keys for millions in crypto)
Example Use Case: A certificate authority (CA) uses an HSM to store its root signing key. The private key never leaves the HSM; all certificate signing operations happen inside the tamper-resistant hardware. Even CA admins cannot extract the key.
Head-to-Head Comparison
| Feature | TEE (AMD SEV, Intel TDX) | Enclave (Intel SGX) | HSM |
| Protection Scope | Entire VM or OS | Small app functions | Cryptographic keys only |
| Memory Size | GBs to TBs | 128-256 MB | KBs to MBs |
| Trusted Code Size | Full OS + app | Only enclave code | Minimal (crypto operations) |
| Performance Overhead | 2-10% | 5-50% (depends on boundary crossing) | <1% (but offloaded) |
| Code Changes Required | None (lift-and-shift) | Significant (refactor for enclaves) | Minimal (use HSM API) |
| Compliance Certifications | Emerging | Limited | FIPS 140-2/3 ✅ |
| Physical Separation | No (same CPU) | No (same CPU) | Yes (dedicated device) |
| Cost | $0.10-0.50/hr premium | Included in CPU | $1,000-20,000/device |
| Use Case | Confidential VMs, cloud databases | Secure enclaves in apps | Key storage, CA, payments |
Combining TEEs, Enclaves, and HSMs
For maximum security, use all three together in a defense-in-depth architecture:
Example: Confidential AI Platform
Layer 1: HSM for Key Management
- Root encryption keys stored in AWS CloudHSM (FIPS 140-2 Level 3)
- HSM generates data encryption keys (DEKs) for each AI model
- Private keys for attestation and client authentication never leave the HSM
Layer 2: TEE for AI Workload
- AI training and inference run in Azure Confidential VMs (AMD SEV-SNP)
- Entire VM memory is encrypted
- DEKs from HSM are used to decrypt model weights inside the TEE
Layer 3: Enclave for Sensitive Operations
- Within the confidential VM, an Intel SGX enclave handles:
- Decrypting user queries
- Signing inference results
- Attestation report generation
- Even if the TEE (VM) is compromised, the enclave provides an additional layer
Result:
- HSM ensures root keys are tamper-proof and FIPS-compliant
- TEE protects the entire AI workload (training data, model weights)
- Enclave adds extra protection for the most sensitive operations
Compliance: Satisfies HIPAA, PCI-DSS, FedRAMP High requirements
Choosing the Right Technology
Decision Tree
1. What do you need to protect?
- Cryptographic keys only → HSM
- Small, specific functions in an app → Enclave
- Entire applications or VMs → TEE
2. What’s your compliance requirement?
- FIPS 140-2 Level 3 required → HSM (only technology with this certification)
- GDPR, HIPAA, general data protection → TEE or Enclave (both work)
- No specific requirement → Choose based on use case
3. How much can you modify your code?
- Cannot change code (legacy apps) → TEE (lift-and-shift)
- Can refactor for security → Enclave (minimize TCB)
- Only need crypto API → HSM (integrate via SDK)
4. What’s your budget?
- Cloud budget (pay-as-you-go) → TEE (~10-30% premium on VMs)
- Moderate budget → Enclave (often included in CPU, just dev effort)
- Large budget (enterprise, government) → HSM ($1,000-20,000 per device)
5. Where is your data?
- In the cloud → TEE (best cloud integration)
- On-premises → Enclave or HSM (more control)
- Edge/mobile → Enclave (ARM TrustZone, low power)
Real-World Scenarios
Scenario 1: Healthcare AI in the Cloud
Requirement: Train AI on patient data in the cloud while complying with HIPAA
Solution: TEE (AMD SEV-SNP Confidential VM)
Why:
- Need to protect entire datasets (GBs of medical records)
- Cannot refactor existing TensorFlow training code for enclaves
- HIPAA requires encryption in use (TEE provides this)
- HSM alone doesn’t protect data during computation
Implementation: Deploy training pipeline in Google Confidential VMs; use HSM for encrypting model exports
Scenario 2: Payment Card Processing
Requirement: Decrypt and process credit card numbers while complying with PCI-DSS
Solution: Enclave (Intel SGX) + HSM
Why:
- PCI-DSS requires FIPS 140-2 compliance (HSM stores card encryption keys)
- Only card decryption logic needs protection (enclave is efficient)
- Enclave minimizes Trusted Computing Base (reduces audit scope for PCI)
Implementation: HSM stores Card Decryption Keys (CDKs); SGX enclave fetches keys from HSM and decrypts card data inside enclave
Scenario 3: Blockchain Validator
Requirement: Secure private keys for a proof-of-stake validator managing $10M in crypto
Solution: HSM (Yubico YubiHSM or Ledger Nano HSM)
Why:
- Only need to protect a single private key (32 bytes)
- Physical tampering is a real threat (HSMs are tamper-resistant)
- Validator software doesn’t need protection (key signing happens in HSM)
Implementation: Validator software calls HSM API to sign blocks; private key never leaves the HSM
Scenario 4: Confidential SaaS Platform
Requirement: Offer SaaS AI features where customers can verify their data is isolated
Solution: TEE (Confidential VMs per customer) + Remote Attestation
Why:
- Each customer gets a dedicated confidential VM (strong isolation)
- Attestation proves to customers that isolation is enforced
- No code changes required (existing SaaS app runs in TEE)
Implementation: Deploy on Phala Cloud or Azure Confidential Computing; provide attestation dashboard to customers
Limitations and Trade-offs
TEE Limitations
Cons:
- Larger Trusted Computing Base (entire OS is trusted)
- Cannot protect against bugs in the OS or app code
- Performance overhead (~2-10%)
- No live migration (VMs must be terminated for maintenance)
Best For: Large applications, cloud workloads, lift-and-shift scenarios
Enclave Limitations
Cons:
- Small memory (<256MB for Intel SGX)
- High development effort (code refactoring required)
- Significant performance overhead if data crosses enclave boundary frequently
- Limited ecosystem (fewer tools than TEEs)
Best For: Small, security-critical functions; minimizing TCB; high-assurance scenarios
HSM Limitations
Cons:
- Only protects keys, not data or computation
- Expensive ($1,000-20,000 per device + maintenance)
- Latency for network-attached HSMs (1-10ms per operation)
- Doesn’t scale elastically (physical devices)
Best For: Key management, compliance, root CAs, payment processing
The Future: Convergence and Integration
Trends
1. TEEs with Enclave Features
Future CPUs will blur the lines:
- AMD SEV with sub-VM enclaves
- Intel TDX with SGX-like partitions within Trust Domains
Result: Get both large-scale protection (TEE) and minimal TCB (enclave) in one solution
2. HSMs Integrated with TEEs
Cloud providers are integrating HSMs with confidential VMs:
- AWS Nitro Enclaves + CloudHSM integration
- Azure Confidential VMs + Dedicated HSM
Result: Root keys in HSM, computation in TEE, best of both worlds
3. Confidential Cloud-Native Stack
Future platforms will offer:
- TEE-based confidential Kubernetes
- Enclave-based service mesh (secure microservices communication)
- HSM-backed secret management
Result: End-to-end confidential computing without manual integration
4. Hardware Attestation Standards
The Confidential Computing Consortium is developing:
- Unified attestation formats (works across AMD, Intel, ARM, NVIDIA)
- Cross-vendor trust (verify TEEs from different manufacturers)
Result: Mix TEEs, enclaves, and HSMs from different vendors seamlessly
Frequently Asked Questions
Can I use Intel SGX and AMD SEV together?
Yes. You can run an AMD SEV-SNP confidential VM and use Intel SGX enclaves within it (if the CPU supports both). This provides defense-in-depth: the VM-level TEE protects the whole application, and the enclave adds extra protection for sensitive functions.
Is Intel SGX a TEE or an enclave?
Intel SGX is an enclave technology. It protects small memory regions within a process, not entire VMs. AMD SEV and Intel TDX are TEEs because they protect entire virtual machines.
Do I need an HSM if I’m using a TEE?
Not always. TEEs can handle many use cases without an HSM. However, if you need:
- FIPS 140-2/3 certification (compliance requirement)
- Physical tamper resistance (protecting keys worth millions)
- Long-term key storage (keys that must survive server failures)
Then add an HSM for root key management while using the TEE for data processing.
Which is more secure: TEE or enclave?
Enclaves have a smaller Trusted Computing Base (only the enclave code), which theoretically makes them more secure. However, TEEs protect more data and are easier to deploy. For most use cases, both provide strong security. Use enclaves when you need maximum assurance and can afford the development effort.
Can HSMs protect data in use?
No. HSMs only protect cryptographic keys and perform cryptographic operations. They don’t protect data during general computation. For data in use protection, you need a TEE or enclave. HSMs complement TEEs/enclaves by securing the encryption keys used by those technologies.
What’s the difference between Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone?
Both are enclave technologies, but:
- Intel SGX: x86 CPUs, up to 256MB encrypted memory, for servers and PCs
- ARM TrustZone: ARM CPUs, variable memory (often smaller), for mobile and embedded devices
SGX is better for server-side secure enclaves; TrustZone is better for mobile/IoT use cases.
Are TEEs and enclaves vulnerable to side-channel attacks?
Potentially, yes. Academic research has shown side-channel attacks (Spectre, Meltdown, cache timing) against both TEEs and enclaves. However:
- Modern CPUs include mitigations (AMD SNP, Intel TDX have protections)
- Practical attacks are difficult and require proximity
- Risk is far lower than trusting administrators
Always use the latest CPU generations and keep firmware updated.
Conclusion
TEEs, Enclaves, and HSMs are complementary technologies:
- TEEs: Best for protecting entire applications and large datasets in the cloud
- Enclaves: Best for small, security-critical functions where you can minimize the Trusted Computing Base
- HSMs: Best for cryptographic key management and compliance
For maximum security, use them together in a layered architecture:
- HSM for root keys
- TEE for data and applications
- Enclave for the most sensitive operations
As hardware security evolves, these technologies will converge, making confidential computing easier and more powerful. The future of cloud computing is confidential by default—and TEEs, enclaves, and HSMs are the foundation.